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Abstract The individual level of subjective well-being (SWB) has been shown to
predict a number of future observable outcomes. Behaviour may however also be
affected by the slope of SWB with respect to certain variables. We here use latent-
class analysis to model both intercept and slope heterogeneity in the SWB-income
relationship, and construct a continuous measure of the marginal utility of income.
We show this marginal utility does predict future behaviour: those who value income
more (who have a higher income elasticity of well-being) are less likely to retire. This
correlation is found conditional on both the level of income and the level of well-being.
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1 Introduction
While the retirement decision has been at the heart of much research across OECD
countries, this work has mostly concentrated on the “objective” characteristics of
the individual and the job that lead to retirement (such as age, health, income and
partner’s labour-force status). Relatively less is known about the relationship be-
tween subjective well-being and retirement. Most of the literature in this area has
focused on how retirement affects life satisfaction (Wottiez and Theeuwes [1998];
Kim and Moen [2001]; Lindeboom et al. [2002]; Charles [2004]; Borsch-Supan and
Jurges [2007]; Seitsamo [2007]; Bonsang and Klein [2012]). Shultz et al. [1998] con-
sider the relative importance of “push” (e.g. poor health) and “pull” (e.g. leisure)
factors on retirement satisfaction, Elder and Rudolph [1999] investigate the role of fi-
nancial planning and expectations, Panis [2004] relates annuities and wealth to both
retirement satisfaction and measures of depression, and Bender [2004] emphasises
the non-economic determinants of well-being in retirement.
Perhaps of greater policy interest is the reverse relationship: does well-being
when working predict the age at which the individual retires? With pension systems
needing to be re-designed to become sustainable, and the preferred option in many
countries consisting in encouraging individuals to stay on at work, understanding
who retires and when is of great practical policy interest. Yet, although subjective
well-being has been shown to predict a variety of future behaviours in panel data,
it has almost never been used to predict retirement (an exception is Debrand and
Sirven [2009], who confirm a negative impact of job satisfaction on retirement). This
is what we do here.
We use data from the American Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to estimate
the relationship between well-being when at work and subsequent retirement. We
indeed find that those who are happier when working are less likely to retire over the
next two years. But our main contribution is to allow heterogeneity in individual
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well-being functions, and specifically in terms of how much individuals value income.
One of the key characteristics of retirement is the associated loss of income. However,
it is entirely possible that some individuals value income more than do others. If
this is the case, then those whose well-being is the most strongly-related to income
should be (ceteris paribus) less likely to retire.1 The broad approach here is to
allow heterogeneity into individual well-being functions, in terms of the estimated
coefficients in the well-being regression: this is slope heterogeneity. We then use
the variation across individuals in these estimated coefficients to predict their future
behaviour.
For this to work, we obviously need some variability across individuals in the
estimated coefficient on income in a well-being regression. We could obtain this
in an ex ante manner, by estimating separate equations by age, education, gender
and so on (or by introducing interactions).2 We here take an ex post approach,
and let the data themselves decide: we appeal to a finite mixture model (FMM)
to model heterogeneity in the correlation between income and well-being, whereby
individuals are sorted (probabilistically) into different classes. The model strongly
rejects the hypothesis of an equal effect of income on well-being across groups. We
use the estimated income coefficients in each group, and the individual’s probability
of belonging to each group, to construct a continuous individual-specific measure
of the marginal utility of income. We then see whether each individual’s estimated
marginal utility of income affects their future retirement behaviour.
We believe that this work adds to the existing literature on well-being and re-
tirement in a number of ways. First, we introduce heterogeneity into the income to
well-being relationship. This allows us to explore the determinants of class mem-
1This is somewhat similar to the argument made in Jakubson [1988], where the presence of the marginal utility
of wealth introduces an individual fixed effect into labour supply. We here try to explicitly measure this marginal
utility, and allow it to change within individual over time.
2This is what Finkelstein et al. [2013] do, by interacting health and permanent income in a subjective well-being
regression. They find that the marginal utility of income falls as health worsens.
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bership. Our results suggest that “money buys happiness” much more for one group
than for another, and also provide us with information about “for whom it buys
the most happiness”. Second, our retirement model suggests a significant negative
effect of this estimated marginal utility of income: those who value income the least
are more likely to retire. We can then encourage labour-force participation via in-
come measures for those who are most “income-sensitive”, but much less so for the
other groups. Finding that the slope of the estimated well-being function predicts
future behaviour is also a new finding in the empirical literature on the validation of
subjective well-being measures.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we provide
a brief overview of the existing literature on the marginal utility of income. Section 3
then describes the data and the initial results, and Section 4 explains the econometric
methodology. In Section 5 we present our results and answer the question of the
impact of the marginal utility of income on the probability of retirement. Last,
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Retirement Decision and the Marginal Utility
of Income
2.1 The marginal utility of income in structural models of
retirement
Retirement behaviour has been at the core of a considerable body of theoretical
analysis (see Lumsdaine and Mitchell [1999]). The retirement decision is usually
modeled in a dynamic framework based on the maximization of the worker’s lifetime
utility, and which allows for heterogeneity between workers, as in Gustman and
Steinmeier [1986]. Stock and Wise [1990] introduced the option-value model, where
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individuals compare at any age the expected present value of retiring at any future
age with the expected present value of retiring immediately, up to the mandatory
age of retirement. The maximum of this difference is called the option value, and
workers will delay their retirement as long as the option value is positive. In Stock
and Wise’s model, the indirect utility from future income can be written as follows:
Vt(r) =
∑r−1
s=t β
s−tUw(Ys) +
∑T
s=r β
s−tUR(Bs(r)), where Uw(Ys) is the indirect utility
of future wage income Ys and UR(Bs(r)) is that of future retirement benefits Bs(r).
Individuals live until age T . The utilities of future wage and retirement income are
parameterized as:
Uw(Ys) = Y
γ
s + ωs and UR(Bs(r)) = (kBs(r))γ + ξs, where ωs and ξs are individual-
specific random effects. There is heterogeneity in the effect of income on utility
here, as the marginal utility of income when working is different from that when
retired (if k 6= 1). This heterogeneity in the marginal utility of income appears
within individuals between periods, but not between individuals. Between-individual
heterogeneity here comes from the individual-specific random effects, ωs and ξs, which
do not affect the marginal utility of income. Gustman and Steinmeier [2005] develop
this model by allowing individuals to have differing time preferences. Individuals
with high time preferences (i.e. with a high discount factor) perceive the actuarial
level of Social Security benefits to be unfair (even though they are designed to be
actuarially fair). As such, they have a greater incentive to retire as soon as benefits
become available. This helps explain why so many individuals collect benefits at the
earliest opportunity, at the cost of reduced social security wealth (at an age when
the option value is still positive).
We here add to this rich retirement literature by allowing the marginal utility of
income U ′w(Ys) to differ across individuals, so that U
′
w,i(Ys) for individual i may differ
from U ′w,j(Ys) for individual j. In line with the option value model above, those who
value their labour income more (who have a higher marginal utility of income when
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at work) will have a higher option value and will so retire later.
2.2 Measuring the marginal utility of income
As we wish to evaluate the role of the marginal utility of income in predicting re-
tirement, our first task is the estimation of the former. For this we require a proxy
measure of utility, which will here be the subjective well-being score available in
the HRS. One suspicion amongst economists is that what individuals say, includ-
ing about their well-being, may not always reveal their true feelings and preferences
(and thus their behaviour): see Adler [2013]; Clark [2015]. A useful response to
this suspicion comes from the literature in which cross-section distributions of well-
being predict individual future behaviour in panel data. The underlying idea here
is that individuals can be shown to discontinue activities that are associated with
lower well-being (see Kahneman et al. [1993]; Frijters [2000]; Shiv and Huber [2000]).
One such example is job satisfaction predicting future job quits, even when control-
ling for wages, hours of work and other standard individual and job characteristics
(see, amongst others, Freeman [1978]; Clark et al. [1998]; Clark [2001]; Kristensen
and Westergaard-Nielsen [2006]); this can also be applied to the duration of self-
employment Georgellis et al. [2007]. Clark [2003] shows that the change in mental
stress on entering unemployment predicts unemployment duration: those who suf-
fered the sharpest drop in well-being were the quickest to leave. In the realm of
work, job satisfaction is correlated with other observable outcomes: with firm per-
formance in Iaffaldano and Muchinsky [1985] and Ostroff [1992], and with customer
satisfaction in service industries in Rogers et al. [1994]. This predictive power is
also found in other domains of life. Life satisfaction predicts marital break-up (Gu-
ven et al. [2012]), as well as future morbidity and mortality (Steptoe et al. [2012])
and child-bearing (Cetre et al. [2015]). This literature has therefore arguably shown
that individual subjective well-being scores are at least partly interpersonally com-
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parable in the cross-section, otherwise they would not be able to predict the future
cross-section distribution of individual behaviour and outcomes.
We here consider the relationship between SWB and income in order to esti-
mate the marginal utility of income, and will do so via a finite mixture model. The
underlying idea in these models is that the unknown population distribution with
respect to the regression coefficients may be empirically approximated by a mixture
of distributions with a finite number of classes. The path-breaking work on the
expectations-maximization (EM) algorithm (by Dempster et al. [1977] and Aitkin
and Rubin [1985]) made latent-class models accessible to applied researchers. In re-
cent years, the finite mixture model has been used in a number of applications, e.g.
in Eckstein and Wolpin [1999]; Morey et al. [2006], and the work of Deb who has
contributed a great deal in rendering these models attractive (see Deb and Trivedi
[1997]; Ayyagari et al. [2009]; Deb et al. [2009]). Clark et al. [2005] model intercept
and slope heterogeneity using latent class techniques to allow the parameters of the
unobserved individual utility function to differ across individuals. In this paper we
follow the same approach. Our data here identify two classes of individuals, and
strongly reject the hypothesis that the marginal effect of income on well-being is
identical across classes. It is worth underlining that the introduction of individ-
ual fixed effects (intercept heterogeneity) would not capture this effect of different
estimated coefficients between groups (slope heterogeneity).
Last, in the existing SWB literature marginal utility is traditionally estimated
(taking unobserved heterogeneity into account or not) conditional on a wide range
of other right-hand side variables (these commonly include gender, marital- and
labour-force status, health, education, etc.). The danger here is that some of these
right-hand side variables may themselves be functions of income: one obvious can-
didate is health (see Dolan et al. [2011]). As such, their use as explanatory variables
means that we potentially condition out a large part of the correlation between in-
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come and SWB. As we would like to establish the overall effect of income on utility,
including any of these indirect effects, we first regress SWB on income and a few
other exogenous variables, such as age, gender, and race. As a robustness check, we
also consider a specification with additional variables in the SWB equation.
3 Data
We use data from the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which is a nationally-
representative longitudinal survey of individuals aged over 50 and their spouses. The
first 1992 wave covered 12,652 individuals from 7,702 households and was face-to-
face; subsequent interviews were conducted by telephone. The HRS initially sampled
persons in birth cohorts 1931 through 1941 in 1992, with follow-up interviews every
two years. In 1998, individuals from the 1924 to 1930 and 1942 to 1947 cohorts were
added to the original sample; and in 2004 it was the turn of individuals from the 1948
to 1953 cohorts. Our analysis here uses Version I of the data prepared by RAND,
which is a cleaned and processed version of the HRS data. We have 10 waves of data
available from 1992 to 2010, of which we use Waves 2 to 8, i.e. from 1994 to 2006.
The measure of subjective well-being in the RAND-HRS data appears in all waves,
but with a different response scale in Wave 1 which cannot easily be converted to
that in later waves. We thus drop Wave 1. We do not use the last two waves as
occupation there is coded differently, and in a way that makes comparisons with the
previous waves tricky.3 The well-being measure is an abridged version of the Center
3In the data up to 2006, the 1980 SOCs (Standard Occupational Codes) were collapsed into 17 categories following
a hierarchical structure taking into account knowledge, skill level and experience. From year 2008 onwards (waves
9 and 10), on the other hand, the 2000 SOCs were collapsed into 25 categories, which are grouped according to
“job families”. The general concept behind this new classification consists in combining people who work together
producing the same kinds of goods and services regardless of their skill level, for example doctors, nurses, and
health technicians. In addition, the 2000 SOCs have more professional, technical, and service occupations and fewer
production and administrative-support occupations, which makes it more difficult to convert one classification into
the other. Although a “ ‘crosswalk” was created for this very purpose, it only covers the management/professional
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for Epidemiologic Studies-Depression (CESD) Scale (Radloff [1977]). The CESD
depression scale originally comprised twenty items. The HRS only retains eight of
these: depressive feelings, everything seen as an effort, restless sleep, could not get
going, loneliness, sadness, enjoyment, happiness. All of the questions behind the
CESD score are binary Yes/No indicators of the respondent’s feelings “much of the
time during the past week prior” to the interview. The between-item validity of the
CESD scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.72) is sufficiently high for the well-being measure
to be considered as robust. The resulting depression score is the number of questions
to which the individual answers “Yes” for the first six items and “No” for the last
two. We then reverse this depression score to produce a subjective well-being scale,
where 0 indicates the worst level of psychological wellbeing and 8 the best.4
Our regression sample from the HRS is defined as follows. For the purpose of our
analysis, we require that the individual be in work at wave t and also be observed
at wave t + 1. We concentrate on individuals who are at “prime retirement age” in
the US, 55-70, at both waves t and t+ 1. We also drop those who are retired in the
first period in which we observe them (as we then have no pre-retirement observation
when they were employed). We keep the observations only on individuals who are
in employment; any subsequent observations once they are retired are dropped. The
approach is then to relate the individual’s current characteristics when employed to
their probability of being retired two years later. Last, some individuals are observed
to retire but subsequently re-enter the labour market. We drop all observations on
these individuals, and as such consider retirement as an absorbing state. Our final
estimation consists of 22,075 observations on individuals in employment, representing
7,975 individuals, amongst whom 41% will retire over the seven waves of data.
categories.
4CESD scores are missing for about 7% of the observations we could have used in our regressions. We have
checked to see whether the sample is balanced according to the presence/absence of CESD. We find differences only
with respect to gender and education, both of which we control for in our empirical analysis.
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We have information about the usual socio-demographic and economic variables
(gender, marital status, number of children, age, education, race, health, total house-
hold wealth, total household income) and job-related variables (number of hours
worked, occupation). The HRS includes both objective and subjective (self-assessed)
health. As in Finkelstein et al. [2013], we consider the objective measure, the number
of health conditions (although our results are remarkably similar with self-assessed
health). Individuals are asked whether they have the eight following health con-
ditions: high blood pressure or hypertension; diabetes or high blood sugar; cancer
or a malignant tumor of any kind except skin cancer; chronic lung disease except
asthma, such as chronic bronchitis or emphysema; heart attack, coronary heart dis-
ease, angina, congestive heart failure, or other heart problems; stroke or transient
ischemic attack (TIA); emotional, nervous, or psychiatric problems; and arthritis or
rheumatism. No problems are reported by 30% of the sample, and only one in eight
report three or more health conditions. The average number of health conditions is
just over one.
The HRS also includes two less-common subjective variables. The first is risk
aversion, on a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 indicates the least risk-averse preferences.5
The second concerns the financial-planning horizon. Individuals are asked “In decid-
ing how much of your (family) income to spend or save, people are likely to think
about different financial planning periods. In planning your (family’s) savings and
expenditure, which of the time periods listed in the booklet is most important to you
[and your husband/wife/partner]?”. The variable is coded 1 if the answer is “next
5This variable is based on a series of “income-gamble” questions: it is coded 1 if the respondent would take a
job with even chances of doubling or halving income; 2 for a job with even chances of doubling income or cutting it
by a third; 3 for a job with even chances of doubling income or cutting it by 20%; and 4 if he would take or stay
in a job that guaranteed current income given any of the above alternatives. As these questions were not asked in
the 1994 and 1996 waves of the HRS, nor in the interviews by proxy, we replace missing values with data from the
closest past wave for every individual. The sample size falls when we include risk-aversion. Most of our sample is
risk-averse, with 64% giving the most risk-averse answer and only 12% the least risk-averse answer.
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few months”, 2 for “next year”, 3 for “next few years”, 4 for “next 5-10 years”, and 5
for “longer than 10 years”. Most individuals say that they think in terms of the next
few years or next 5 to 10 years, which are the intermediate answers.6 We will control
for risk-aversion and financial planning in some specifications of our analysis of the
determinants of retirement, as they have been shown to be important in existing
work.
Table 1 in the Appendix describes our estimation sample. We consider all individ-
uals who were working at the time of the interview. The average CESD score is just
under 7 (on the 0 to 8 scale), and 15% of observations in employment are followed by
retirement within the next two years. Average household equivalent income (in 2011
dollars) is 72 500$ (we equivalise by the square root of household size, so that this
corresponds to total household income of 145 000$ for a family of four). Household
net worth (which is not equivalent) can be either positive or negative (in the case of
debts). To use this variable in log form, we divide by 100 000, take away the mini-
mum sample value of net worth from each observation (which transformation makes
all values weakly positive), add one, and then take the log. Average net worth (before
this transformation) in the sample is a little over 450 000$. Household net worth is
defined as all assets (including housing) minus all debts, but does not include the
value of Individual Retirement Accounts. This latter appears as a separate variable
in Table 1.7
The distribution of well-being in our estimation sample appears in Table 2. This
is largely right-skewed, with over 75 per cent of the pooled sample reporting scores
of 7 or 8, and less than 1 per cent a zero score. The “between” distribution shows
that just under 70 per cent of the sample recorded an 8 score at least once, while
6Financial planning is missing in the same way as risk aversion, as described in the previous note. We take the
same “imputation” approach to missing values as described there.
7The average value of IRAs in this sample is just under 50 000$. Half of the sample have no IRA savings. As
we are dealing with an older sample here, and IRAs were only introduced in 1974, we would expect this “no-IRA”
percentage to fall over time.
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fewer than 2 per cent have ever produced a zero score. “Within” individuals (in the
last column), three-quarters of those who ever reported a score of 8 had a score of 8
at each wave. On the contrary, less than half of the individuals with a score of zero
had a score of zero at every wave. This might either reflect measurement error, or
that most people who reported such low scores had indeed had a bad year, and had
better years in other waves.
Before starting the econometric analysis, we present the bivariate relationships
between our three key variables: subjective well-being, income and retirement. Fig-
ure 1 shows the non-parametric estimation of mean CESD by quantiles of total
household equivalent income.8 In this cross-section, income is positively correlated
with subjective well-being (as is very commonly the case), with the relationship being
notably concave.
Figure 1 plots an “average” utility function as if individuals were homogeneous in
their valuation of income. However, individuals sharing the same observable char-
acteristics may be more or less happy depending on what we might call their “per-
sonality” type. Self-determination theory (see Ryan and Deci [2000]) suggests that
behaviour can be intrinsically or extrinsically motivated. An internally-motivated
individual derives much more utility from social interactions and community in-
volvement than from accumulating wealth, while the extrinsically-motivated derive
their utility from income. Individuals may also be heterogeneous in the way in which
they translate their latent unobserved utility into a discrete verbal satisfaction an-
swer. The FMM analysis will allow the relationship between income and well-being
to differ between individuals in terms of both the intercept and the slope.
We now turn to the relationship between income at time t and retirement between
8Total household income includes earnings from work, household capital income, income from employer pensions
or annuities, unemployment insurance or worker’s compensation, social security retirement or disability benefits,
other government transfers (veteran’s benefits, food stamps, etc.), and other household income such as alimony or
lump sums from insurance, pensions or inheritances.
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waves t and t+ 1. The effect of income here is ambiguous, as retirement is a labour-
supply decision. If leisure is a normal good, people should consume more leisure
as income increases (the income effect). On the other hand, if that income stems
from a higher wage rate, the worker will substitute work for leisure, by substituting
away from leisure due to its higher opportunity cost (the substitution effect). Figure
2 shows that there is a clear negative relationship between household income and
retirement (consistent with the substitution effect dominating the income effect).
This may not persist in multivariate analysis. Those at the top of income distribution
are likely to be in better health and to work in “nicer” occupations, due to their
higher education, and the fact that they retire less may not only reflect income and
substitution effects.
Last, as shown in Figure 3, SWB and retirement seem to be negatively correlated,
especially at the two tails of the SWB distribution. The happier retire less, at least
in a bivariate sense.
The following section describes the methodology that we use to put all of these
pieces together in a multivariate sense. Little work has considered the impact of
SWB, even in levels, on the retirement transition. We will estimate CESD as a
function of income in order to have an estimate of the marginal utility of income:
this latter is then used to predict retirement, together with the levels of income and
CESD.
4 Econometric Methods
4.1 First Step: Estimating the Marginal Utility of Income
This paper is one of only few to use latent class models to analyse individual unob-
served heterogeneity in the marginal utility of income, and we believe the first to use
the analysis results to predict future behaviour.
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The FMM distinguishes between a finite, usually small, number of latent classes
of individuals (this number is called C in the presentation below). Each class cor-
responds to a separate regression in which both the intercept and the estimated
coefficients differ. We are particularly interested here in the estimated coefficient on
income in the different classes of CESD regressions.
The basic econometric model used to model SWB is:
E(WBt|INCt, Xt) = αINCt + βXt (1)
where our key explanatory variable is INC, the logarithm of total equivalent house-
hold income, and Xt is a vector of individual characteristics (sociodemographic,
labour-market and wealth variables, and region dummies). Equation 1 is first es-
timated by OLS, and here α/100 is the absolute change in WB resulting from a
1% increase in income. However, if WB is drawn from distinct subpopulations, the
OLS estimate of α may hide considerable heterogeneity. We therefore estimate a
finite mixture model, where sub-populations are assumed to be drawn from normal
distributions.
In the FMM the random WB variable is considered as a draw from a population
which is an additive mixture of C distinct classes in proportions pij such that:
g(WBi | Xi; θ1, ..., θC ; pii1, ..., piiC) =
C∑
j=1
piij
Ti∏
t=1
fj(WBit | Xit, θj), (2)
0 ≤ piij ≤ 1,
∑C
j=1 piij = 1, ∀i = 1, ..., N ;
where θj is the associated set of parameters, Ti = 1, ..., 7 is the number of times the
individual i is observed, and the density of component j for observation i is given
by:
fj(WBit | Xit, θj) = 1
σj
√
2pi
exp
(
− 1
2σ2j
(WBit − αjINCit − βjXit)2
)
(3)
The finite mixture model is estimated using maximum likelihood and cluster-corrected
(for within-individual correlation) robust standard errors. Starting from the initial
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estimates of component proportions pij, we then re-estimate the model assuming a
prior component probability of the form:
piij(Zi | δ) = Z ′iδ, 0 ≤ piij ≤ 1,
C∑
j=1
piij = 1,∀i = 1, ..., N. (4)
The prior component probability pij now depends on observables Z and so varies
across observations: individuals with different observable characteristics then likely
have different probabilities of belonging to the various classes. The same individual
with different values of the Z at different points in time will have time-varying
probabilities of being in the various classes.
As put forward in Deb et al. [2009], finite mixture models have many advantages,
but also some drawbacks. A finite mixture model may only fit the data better than
a basic OLS due to outliers, which are picked up in the FMM via additional mixture
components. As such, even if the use of FMM is motivated by ex ante reasoning,
the different latent classes should be justified ex post.
The FMM model yields the prior and posterior probabilities of being in each of
the latent classes, conditional on all observed covariates (and also on the observed
WB outcome for the posterior probability). Using Bayes’ theorem, the posterior
probability of being in component k is:
Pr(i ∈ k | θ,WBi) = piik
∏Ti
t=1 fk(WBit | Xit, θk)∑C
j=1 piij
∏Ti
t=1 fj(WBit | Xit, θj)
, ∀k = 1, 2, ..., C. (5)
The posterior probability varies across observations, as does the prior probability
when re-estimated conditional on Z. The difference between these two is that poste-
rior probabilities are also conditional on the outcome WBi. The latter can of course
be used to explore the determinants of class membership, but in what follows we
stick to the prior probabilities for reasons that we will set out in Section 5.
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4.2 Second Step: Using the FMM Results to Predict Retire-
ment
Latent-class analysis provides different estimates of the marginal utility of income
for each group, the αk, ∀k = 1, 2, ..., C, along with the prior probabilities pik(Zi | δ)
and posterior probabilities Pr(i ∈ k | θ,WBi) of belonging to class k. We exploit
this individual heterogeneity to create a continuous measure of the marginal utility
of income, defined as:
e =
C∑
k=1
αkpik(Zi | δ) (6)
We will then investigate the effect of e on the probability of retirement by wave t+ 1
for individuals who are in work at wave t. Our probit retirement-probability model
is:
Pr(Retirei,t+1 = 1 | Vi,t) = Φ(V ′i,tγt) (7)
where Pr denotes the probability, φ is the cumulative distribution function of the
standard normal distribution, and V is a vector of covariates. The parameters γ are
estimated by maximum likelihood. Retirei,t+1 is a dummy coded 1 if individual i
stops working between waves t and t+1 and declares themselves to be “fully retired”
at wave t+ 1, which is the case for 15 per cent of our pooled sample.
5 Results
5.1 Well-Being Results From Finite Mixture Models
We here estimate the marginal utility of income, which we argue is reflected by the
coefficient on log equivalent household income in a subjective well-being regression,
using both a simple OLS regression and a number of specifications of a finite mixture
model. The results are presented in Table 3. As argued in Section 2, we only
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introduce very few variables as controls in the main equation, namely gender, age,
and race, which are unambiguously exogenous. This way, we are sure to pick up both
the direct and indirect effects of income on SWB. The robustness section will test
specifications which include other explanatory variables. The model selection criteria
(AIC/BIC) at the foot of the table clearly favour a 2-component mixture model as
compared to the 1-component OLS model. The 3-component model fails to converge
after a reasonable number of iterations, suggesting that the third component is trying
to fit only a small number of outliers.
The OLS results suggest a significant correlation between log income and SWB
with an estimated coefficient of 0.31: SWB rises by 0.31 points as income doubles.
The FMM identifies two latent classes. The probability of class membership is es-
timated by a multinomial logit regression (here actually a simple logit, as we only
have two classes). The results of this estimation will be discussed in Table 4 below.
In this model, each observation has a non-zero probability of belonging to each class.
Within-individual, this probability will change over time with the values of the indi-
vidual right-hand side variables in Table 4. All standard errors are clustered at the
individual level.
The estimated average probability over all observations of belonging to Class 1
is 32%. In this first “smaller” group, income has a significant effect on SWB with
a coefficient of 0.329; by way of contrast, in the “larger” second group the effect of
income on SWB is only small (0.039). There is thus evidence of striking differences
in the SWB-income relationship, which was masked in OLS estimation. The two
identified groups are dissimilar, with the high marginal utility of income group (Class
1) being less happy on average (with a mean SWB score of 5.25) than those in Class
2 (mean SWB of 7.75).9 Figure 4 shows that the distribution of predicted SWB in
9These mean SWB figures come directly from the estimated coefficients in Table 3, and reflect the predicted
CESD of a hypothetical individual who is 100% in the class in question, and with an income equal to the sample
average.
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the second group is massed at the right end of the distribution: individuals here have
high SWB scores of between 7 and 8.10 The predicted SWB distribution in Class 1
is far less concentrated (as the coefficient on log income is over seven times larger)
and mostly lies between 4 and 6.
Any number of specifications of the mixture model can be estimated according
to the explanatory variables Zi included in the multinomial logit determining class
membership. Table 4 illustrates five possibilities for the logit equation predicting
membership of Class 1, going from an extremely stripped-down version in column (1),
where it is only log equivalent household income which determines class membership,
to column (5), which is the most complete specification.11 Column (5) is our preferred
specification, as it corresponds to the smallest AIC and BIC.12 It is this specification
which is behind the FMM well-being estimates shown in Table 3. This specification
includes socio-demographic and job variables, as well as the log of net worth and the
log of the value of the individual’s IRA.
The results show that women, singles, non-whites, the less-educated, and those
with worse health are more likely to be in the less-happy high marginal utility of
income group. Neither age nor the number of children predict class membership.
Income reduces the probability of being in class 1, even when we control for wealth.
10This predicted SWB distribution can be inferred from the numbers in Table 3. In Class 2, the estimated
constant is 7.208, with a coefficient on equivalent log income of 0.039. A household with income of zero has a value
of log income of zero also (as we add one to ensure positive values), and thus predicted well-being of 7.208. That
the distribution is extremely tight comes from both the log transformation and the small estimated coefficient on
income. A household with equivalent income of 100 000$ can be seen to have a predicted level of well-being of 7.65;
doubling equivalent income to 200 000$ only increases this fitted value to 7.68.
11Note that the model with socio-demographic variables in column (2) fits the data better than that with the
labour-market variables in column (3), so that the latter variables predict class membership less efficiently.
12The Akaike information criterion (AIC) is a measure of the relative goodness of fit of a statistical model. It
is based on the concept of information entropy, and offers a relative measure of the information lost when a given
model is used to describe reality. Given a set of candidate models for the data, the preferred model is that with the
lowest AIC value. The AIC rewards goodness of fit but discourages overfitting, as it includes a penalty that rises
with the number of estimated parameters. The AIC penalises the number of parameters less than does the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC), but here the two goodness-of-fit measures yield the same results.
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Those in lower-status occupations (Service, Clerical and Administrative, Mechanics,
Construction, compared to Manager and Technician Sup) are more likely to be in
this first class. Last, in column (5), both net worth and IRA are negative, but only
the latter is significant.
The well-being and income results in Table 3 are robust to alternative specifica-
tions of the Zi in Table 4. We continue to find two groups with different valuations
of income. For the majority of our sample, with higher SWB scores, income has
only a small effect on SWB. In the other smaller group, which is less happy, SWB
is much more sensitive to income. Broadly, the small less-happy group, with higher
marginal utility of income, is made up of individuals with characteristics that are
less well-rewarded on the labour market, while the majority of our sample is happier
with better characteristics in this respect, with well-being that is much less affected
by income. Our results are not the same as those from the ECHP data in Clark et al.
[2005], who find 4 classes of individuals, amongst which “one group is both highly
satisfied and has large marginal effects of income on well-being, while another is the
least satisfied and has the lowest marginal effects of income on well-being” (page
C127). This may reflect that our sample is restricted to those who are in work and
age 50 or more, while theirs is not restricted in this way.
5.2 Does the Marginal Utility of Income Affect Retirement?
We now use the two estimated marginal utilities of income and the prior probabil-
ities to calculate an individual-specific continuous measure of the marginal utility
of income (see Equation 6 in Section 4.2). Figure 5 plots out the density of the
prior probability. With only two groups, this marginal utility is a linear function
of pi1 (from Table 3, our marginal utility variable e = 0.329pi1 + 0.039(1 − pi1), so
e = 0.29pi1 + 0.039), and therefore has a very similar distribution to that shown in
Figure 5. The mean value of e is 0.134 with a standard deviation of 0.043. We can
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see from Figure 6 that e is a decreasing function of income: the well-being impact
of income is lower for the richer. Retirement implies stopping work and often lower
income, and we thus suspect that this marginal utility of income may play a role in
the retirement decision. In particular, we expect lower marginal utility of income to
increase retirement, ceteris paribus, conditional on the levels of both well-being and
income.
The results from the probit estimation of retirement appear in Table 5 for the
main coefficients, and Table 6 in the Appendix for those on the other controls. The
five columns here have a triangular structure. Column (1) includes only the marginal
utility of income, income itself, and well-being in order to predict retirement over
the next two years. The coefficient on the marginal utility of income turns out to be
positive, because of its high correlation with the socio-demographic variables, which
are absent from this specification. Since individuals who are women, less educated,
non-white, single, and with a worse health status, are more likely to retire, but also
more likely to have a higher marginal utility of income, the coefficient of our key
variable is here positively biased. Columns (2) through (5) then add progressively
sociodemographic characteristics, job-related variables, net worth and the amount of
the IRA, and risk aversion and financial planning. Once any additional controls are
introduced, the estimated coefficient on the marginal utility of income is negative
and significant. As income is controlled for here, the estimated e coefficient means
that at a given level of income, the individual evaluation of this income helps predict
retirement. Income itself attracts either a negative or a zero estimated coefficient.
The main effect of SWB on retirement is consistently negative: those who are happier
when working retire less. The marginal effect of the marginal utility variable is
large: a one standard deviation rise of 0.043 can be seen to reduce the probability
of retirement by 6.6 percentage points in the fifth specification, (where the average
probability of retirement is 15%).
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Regarding the other controls (see Table 6), we find reasonable results. For exam-
ple, women, the less-educated, and those in worse health retire more (as in Maurer
et al. [2011]). The age dummies attract broadly hump-shaped coefficients, with a
peak at age 64 (meaning this is the peak age at which individuals will retire over the
coming two years: individuals are eligible for Medicare at age 65), and a smaller peak
at age 61 (individuals are eligible for early Social Security retirement benefits at age
62). Part-time workers retire more, perhaps because they have already started their
retirement transition by reducing their work hours. The estimated coefficients on net
worth and the value of the IRA are both insignificant. Those with a pension in the
current job are more likely to retire, while those with current or ex-employer health
insurance retire less. Last, with respect to the behavioural variables, the risk-averse
are more likely to retire, while those with longer planning horizons retire less.
5.3 Robustness Checks
As explained in Section 2, we estimate the marginal utility of income by regressing
SWB on income, with very few exogenous covariates in order to capture both the
direct and indirect effects of income. We have also tested other specifications of this
equation which include additional control variables. The left-hand panel of Table 7
reproduces the results from Table 3 for comparison purposes. The right-hand panel
of Table 7 includes a few additional control variables in the well-being equation,
such as educational attainment and region. The data again can be seen to sort into
two groups with different valuations of income, in the same way as beforehand. We
can use this new specification to calculate the marginal utility of income, and then
evaluate the role of the latter in retirement. The results appear in Table 8. These
confirm our previous results.
We can also re-estimate the specification corresponding to column (5) of Table 4
for various sub-samples (e.g. individuals in a couple, with low/high education, and
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men and women). For brevity, we only describe the salient features here. There
are no sharp sex differences in general. The effect of marginal utility on retirement
is larger for those with less than high-school education, and insignificant for those
with college education and above. Last, the retirement of women in couples is more
sensitive to the marginal utility of income than that of men in couples .
Equally, the nature of the job variables included in Table 5 can be fleshed out. In
particular, we can add a variable indicating whether individual is an employee or self-
employed, and introduce hours of work continuously (instead of just having a dummy
for part-time work). Neither of these inclusions affects our conclusion regarding
the marginal utility of income. The estimated coefficient on self-employed itself
is negative and significant, and the estimated coefficient on income itself becomes
insignificant (suggesting that income was proxying for hours of work in the retirement
decision). We can also reconsider our definition of “retirement” itself. In particular,
we can tighten it to those who both retire and at the same time claim social-security
benefits. This does not change our qualitative results.
While Section 3 discussed missing values on the dependent variable, missing en-
tire observations (i.e. attrition) could be equally important. We investigated by
estimating a probit equation for being missing in Wave t + 1 conditional on being
observed in Wave t. The right-hand side variables in this equation are all those used
to predict retirement in Tables 5 and 6. While some of these did turn out to be
significant (race, marital status and number of children, for example) neither the
level of well-being nor our estimated marginal utility predicted attrition.
The value of the marginal utility of income in Table 5 is calculated as the result
of the estimation of the FMM model. We should therefore bootstrap the probit
retirement estimation (the marginal utility of income is not data, it is an estimate).
We have done so, and find bootstrapped confidence intervals that almost always
differ from those in columns 2 through 5 of Table 5 by ten per cent or less.
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The last, but arguably most important, point is that we do not know the correct
specification of the utility function in terms of income. Countless empirical articles
in Economics use log specifications, and this is true of work on subjective well-being
as well. One interpretation of our negative estimated coefficient on the marginal
utility of income is that the correct specification of the relationship between well-
being and income is flatter than log. We therefore tried a transformation that is
indeed flatter than log (the log of the log of income), but continued to find negative
significant estimates for our marginal utility variable in a retirement regression. Of
course we cannot prove that with the correct functional form between well-being
and income marginal utility would no longer be a significant predictor of retirement.
However, we do not think that this means that our work here is of no use; rather the
interpretation of the estimated coefficient is different. It would then not be marginal
utility that mattered in determining behaviour as such, but rather that this term
acts as an individual-level correction factor. Latent-class estimation would then be
one way of modelling behaviour based on utility maximisation without having to
know exactly what the utility function looks like.
6 Conclusion
We here modeled heterogeneity in the relationship of income to subjective well-
being via latent-class analysis on a nationally-representative sample of US workers
close to retirement. We identify two classes of individuals with distinct marginal
utilities of income. Our main results indicate considerable heterogeneity across the
two latent classes. A smaller group is relatively unhappy, with high marginal utility
of income, and is made up of individuals with characteristics which are less well-
rewarded on the labour market, while the majority group is happier, with better-
rewarded characteristics, with well-being that is less affected by income.
22
We then use these latent-class results to investigate the impact of the marginal
utility of income on retirement. We thus add to the existing retirement literature by
considering a “slope” as well as a “level” impact of well-being upon the probability
of retiring. We find a negative significant effect of the marginal utility of income
on retirement, even controlling for the main effects of income and well-being. Those
who value income more retire less, controlling for how much income they have and
how happy they are. As retirement often implies lower income, a higher marginal
utility of income produces a greater well-being gap between working and retirement,
and thus later retirement.
These findings are pertinent in the current context of pensions. That the majority
of workers close to retirement care relatively less about the income drop from retire-
ment, while a smaller group is much more sensitive to this loss, might help policy
makers in designing labour-supply policy (by targeting the latter group). In general,
most empirical work estimates conditional means: but we have no guarantee that
what works “on average” will work for the group that is most affected by a particular
policy. We also contribute to the validation of SWB scores, by showing that both
the level and slope of self-reported SWB predict future behaviour.
A more general implication is that slope heterogeneity is probably worthy of
further investigation: individuals differ in ways that are not captured by simple fixed
effects. Here this heterogeneity helped to predict labour supply. Future applied
work could usefully appeal to slope heterogeneity to model a wide variety of other
behaviours. Finite mixture models are likely to become a useful complement to the
standard toolbox that economists use to predict individual behaviour.
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7 Appendix
Figure 1: Well-Being and Income
The OLS line corresponds to a regression of WB on income (50 quantiles) and income2:
WˆB = 6.167 + 0.045income− 0.0004income2; R2 = 0.043.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N
Well-being (0-8 scale) 6.94 (1.64) 22,074
Retire 0.15 (0.35) 22,074
Socio-demographic variables
Female 0.51 (0.5) 22,074
Married or partnership 0.75 (0.43) 22,074
Number of children 3.19 (2.02) 22,074
Age 59.92 (3.59) 22,074
Education: less than High school 0.2 (0.4) 22,074
Education: High-school grad 0.54 (0.5) 22,074
Education: College and above 0.26 (0.44) 22,074
White 0.84 (0.37) 22,074
Number of health conditions 1.23 (1.09) 22,074
Job Characteristics
Works 0-29 hours per week 0.2 (0.4) 22,074
Manager or tech sup 0.33 (0.47) 22,074
Sales 0.11 (0.31) 22,074
Clerical and administrative 0.17 (0.37) 22,074
Service 0.16 (0.36) 22,074
Farming, forestry and fishing 0.03 (0.16) 22,074
Mechanics, construction 0.09 (0.29) 22,074
Operator 0.12 (0.33) 22,074
Armed forces 0 (0.02) 22,074
Wealth
Ln(net worth) 4.32 (0.11) 22,074
Ln(IRA) 0.25 (0.44) 22,074
Ln(hh income) 10.76 (0.91) 22,074
Behavioural variables
Risk aversion 3.31 (1.05) 14,794
Financial planning horizon 3.14 (1.16) 15,497
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Table 2: Distribution of the Well-Being Score (CESD)
Overall Between Within
SWB Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Percent
0 137 0.6 121 1.5 47.6
1 267 1.2 241 3 50.1
2 379 1.7 346 4.3 46.7
3 512 2.3 458 5.7 44.1
4 737 3.3 665 8.3 43.2
5 1,186 5.4 1,015 12.7 43.9
6 2,103 9.5 1,710 21.4 45.3
7 4,881 22.1 3,409 42.7 52.4
8 11,873 53.8 5,503 69 75.2
Total 22,074 100 13,468 168.9 59.2
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Figure 2: Retirement and Income
The OLS line corresponds to a (linear probability model) regression of Retire on income (50
quantiles) and income2: ˆRetire = 0.172− 0.00086income− 2.86 ∗ 10−6income2; R2 = 0.0017.
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Figure 3: Retirement and Well-Being
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Table 3: OLS vs FMM
OLS FMM
Class 1 Class 2
Ln(hh income) 0.311*** 0.329*** 0.039***
(0.017) (0.035) (0.005)
Female -0.228*** -0.310*** -0.007
(0.030) (0.067) (0.009)
Age/10 0.154*** 0.372*** 0.010
(0.033) (0.080) (0.012)
White 0.183*** -0.143* 0.079***
(0.044) (0.083) (0.016)
Constant 2.630*** -0.239 7.208***
(0.277) (0.607) (0.091)
Mean of predicted SWB 5.25 7.75
Prob of class membership pi1 = 0.32 pi2 = 0.68
AIC 83437 61957
BIC 83477 62333
Observations 22,074
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 4: Predicted WB by FMM Classes
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Figure 5: Density of the prior probability of belonging to Class 1
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Table 4: Determinants of Prior Probabilities (Class 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(hh income) -0.081*** -0.026*** -0.061*** -0.021*** -0.014**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Female 0.038*** 0.049*** 0.049***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
Married or partnership -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.123***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Age/10 -0.366 -0.390 -0.318
(0.339) (0.340) (0.340)
Age2/100 0.022 0.024 0.019
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Number of children 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
White -0.047*** -0.038** -0.032**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Educ: High-school graduate ref. ref. ref.
Education: less than High school 0.111*** 0.093*** 0.089***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Education: College and above -0.065*** -0.038*** -0.030**
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
Number of health conditions 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.076***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Works 0-29 hours per week -0.017 -0.012 -0.007
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Manager and tech sup ref. ref. ref.
Sales 0.028 0.027 0.026
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Clerical and administrative 0.080*** 0.039** 0.039**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Service 0.143*** 0.077*** 0.074***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020)
Farming, forestry and fishing 0.026 0.053 0.050
(0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
Mechanics, construction 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.060***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
Operator 0.133*** 0.101*** 0.097***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.021)
Armed forces -0.118 -0.068 -0.063
(0.127) (0.170) (0.184)
Ln(net worth) -0.008
(0.048)
Ln(IRA) -0.077***
(0.013)
AIC 63152 62140 62991 62102 62054
BIC 63328 62388 63231 62414 62382
Observations 22,074
Marginal effects; robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Controls for wave and region dummies are included.
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Figure 6: Marginal Utility of Income, by income quantiles
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Table 5: Determinants of the Probability of Retiring-
Exogenous controls in the WB equation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Marginal utility of income 0.472*** -0.582*** -1.892*** -2.078*** -1.527***
(0.066) (0.196) (0.274) (0.417) (0.510)
Ln(hh income) -0.002 -0.001 -0.008* -0.008** -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Well-being (0-8 scale) -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Sociodemo variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job variables No No Yes Yes Yes
Net worth; amount of IRA No No No Yes Yes
Behavioural variables No No No No Yes
Observations 22074 21564 19067 19067 12738
AIC 18351 17247 15272 15276 10680
BIC 18495 17510 15618 15637 11038
Marginal effects; robust standard errors in parentheses;* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The sociodemographic variables in this table are as in Table 4, except that we allow for a more flexible age specification using
a number of age dummies. The job variables, in addition to those in Table 4, now include pension, private health insurance,
and health insurance covering retirees. The estimated coefficients on all of these controls appear in Table 6.
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Table 6: Determinants of the Probability of Retiring-Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female 0.020*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.039***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Married or partnership 0.011 -0.041*** -0.048*** -0.024
(0.010) (0.014) (0.018) (0.021)
Spouse works -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.029***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Number of children -0.003** -0.002 -0.002 -0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
White -0.007 -0.011 -0.012 -0.009
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Education: less than High school 0.049*** 0.084*** 0.089*** 0.071***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.018)
Education: College and above -0.043*** -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.053***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Number of health conditions 0.035*** 0.062*** 0.066*** 0.053***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011)
Age 55-60 ref. ref. ref. ref.
Age 61 0.118*** 0.101*** 0.100*** 0.105***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
Age 62 0.078*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.060***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
Age 63 0.122*** 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.111***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017)
Age 64 0.143*** 0.122*** 0.119*** 0.136***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.020)
Age 65 0.100*** 0.035** 0.032** 0.043**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019)
Age 66 0.101*** 0.028* 0.025 0.044**
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.022)
Age 67-70 0.084*** 0.015 0.011 0.040**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019)
Works 0-29 hours per week 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.049***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Has pension from current job 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.054***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Covered by current or ex-employer hlth ins. -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.021**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Covered by hlth ins. in retirement 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.044***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Ln(net worth) 0.003 -0.061
(0.032) (0.045)
Ln(IRA) -0.006 0.007
(0.010) (0.012)
Risk aversion 0.007**
(0.003)
Financial planning horizon -0.007**
(0.003)
Constant
Observations 22,074 21,564 19,067 19,067 12,738
AIC 18392 17321 15337 15341 10710
BIC 18536 17584 15683 15702 11068
These are the controls of the regressions presented in Table 5. Occupation variables are controlled for, although not displayed.
Marginal effects; robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 41
Table 7: FMM with additional controls in the WB equation
(1) (2)
Exogenous Controls Additional Controls
Class 1 Class 2 Class 1 Class 2
Ln(hh income) 0.329*** 0.039*** 0.277*** 0.027***
(0.035) (0.005) (0.037) (0.005)
Constant -0.239 7.208*** 0.126 7.295***
(0.607) (0.091) (0.639) (0.094)
Mean of predicted SWB 5.25 7.75 5.25 7.76
Prob of class membership pi1 = 0.32 pi2 = 0.68 pi1 = 0.31 pi2 = 0.69
AIC 62054 62067
BIC 62382 62571
Observations 22,074
"Exogenous controls" include: gender, race, age at 1st obs, education, and region dummies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 8: Determinants of the Probability of Retiring-
Additional controls in the WB equation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Marginal utility of income 0.631*** -0.541** -2.283*** -2.470*** -1.893***
(0.078) (0.239) (0.349) (0.557) (0.693)
Ln(hh income) -0.001 -0.001 -0.010** -0.011** -0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Well-being (0-8 scale) -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Sociodemo variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job variables No No Yes Yes Yes
Behavioural variables No No No Yes Yes
Net worth; amount of IRA No No No No Yes
Observations 22,074 21,564 19,067 19,067 12,738
AIC 18339 17251 15278 15282 10682
BIC 18483 17514 15624 15643 11040
Marginal effects; robust standard errors in parentheses;* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The sociodemographic variables in this table are as in Table 4, except that we allow for a more flexible age specification using
a number of age dummies. The job variables, in addition to those in Table 4, now include pension, private health insurance,
and health insurance covering retirees.
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